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NOTE
IT'S GOOD TO BE THE GAME WARDEN:
STATE V. BOYER AND THE EROSION OF PRIVACY
PROTECTION FOR MONTANA SPORTSMEN
Malin J. Stearns*
I. INTRODUCTION
Montana is a land in which environmental protection and
individual freedom are among the most cherished of values. The
rights of Montanans to privacy and to a clean and healthful
environment are considered so essential as to be guaranteed by
the Montana Constitution.' And Montanans value not just
protection, but responsible use of the environment for recre-
ational activities such as hunting and fishing. Although the
legislature and judiciary in Montana are constantly charged
with the difficult task of invoking and balancing such values,
seldom has the Montana Supreme Court so oddly and eagerly
* J.D. Candidate, The University of Montana School of Law, 2004. Special thanks
to those who read this note and provided valuable suggestions, particularly Professor
Margaret Tonan, Jessica Kobos, Edward LeClaire, and Hillary Wandler.
1. Mont. Const. art. II, § 3 (granting the right to a clean and healthful
environment); Mont. Const. art. II, § 10 (granting the right to privacy).
1
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approached these issues as in State v. Boyer.2 The court was
faced with the question of whether a game warden's approach
and subsequent search of a fisherman's boat violated the
fisherman's right to be free from unlawful searches and
seizures.3  In an important decision with far-reaching
implications for sportsmen, the legal community, and all
Montana citizens, the court determined that Montana's
constitution and statutory law allow game wardens almost
unlimited power of search over those fishing on Montana's
waterways. 4 Unfortunately, the majority's holding rests upon a
flawed and incomplete analysis that misinterprets Montana law
and erodes privacy protection in Montana to near nonexistence
in the context of boats on public waters.
This note will analyze how, in reviewing a game warden's
search of a fisherman's boat, the Montana Supreme Court
readjusted the legal interrelationship between wardens and
fishermen, scaled back Montana's emerging jurisprudence of
privacy protection, and improperly implicated the
environmental protections of the Montana Constitution. This
note will first provide a background of each major field in the
legal landscape from which Boyer arose: the stop and search
powers of law enforcement in Montana; the legal rights and
duties of game wardens and Montana sportsmen; search and
seizure issues in hunting and fishing contexts; and the law of
environmental protection in Montana. With this background
established, this note will describe Boyer's factual and
procedural history and explain the Montana Supreme Court's
holding and reasoning. Finally, the note will analyze the Boyer
court's reasoning, address its erroneous application of Montana
statutory and constitutional law, and explain how the Boyer
holding may impact the privacy rights of fishermen and of all
Montanans.
2. 2002 MT 33, 308 Mont. 276, 42 P.3d 771.
3. Boyer, 2002 MT 33, 308 Mont. 276, 42 P.3d 771; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 11
(granting the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures).
4. Boyer, 26, 33.
188 Vol. 65
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Investigatory Stops in Montana
Montana's investigatory stop statute grants law enforce-
ment officers the power to stop an individual for the purpose of
investigating his conduct. The statute provides:
In order to obtain or verify an account of the person's presence or
conduct or to determine whether to arrest the person, a peace
officer may stop any person or vehicle that is observed in
circumstances that create a particularized suspicion that the
person or occupant of the vehicle has committed, is committing, or
is about to commit an offense.5
The Montana Supreme Court first attempted to develop the
legal requirements for an investigatory stop in State v. Farabee.6
In Farabee, police officers were waiting outside a home where
they suspected drug activity was taking place. A person came
out of the house, got into a car, and drove away. 7 The officers
noticed the car was missing a headlight and stopped the driver.8
In the car, driven by Farabee, the officers found bags of
marijuana and drug paraphernalia. 9 Farabee was charged with
felony possession of dangerous drugs with intent to sell and
misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia.1 0 He pled not
guilty and moved to suppress evidence seized by the officers.11
The trial court denied Farabee's motion and he subsequently
pled guilty to the charges, reserving his right to appeal the
denial of his motion to suppress. 12 On appeal, Farabee argued
that the officers did not have the particularized suspicion
required for an investigatory stop.13 The Montana Supreme
Court upheld the conviction, holding the officers had the
requisite particularized suspicion. 14
In reaching this decision, the Farabee court solidified the
5. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-5-401(1) (2003).
6. 2000 MT 265, 302 Mont. 29, 22 P.3d 175.
7. Farabee, 1 6.
8. Id. 6-7.
9. Id.18.
10. Id. 9.
11. Id.
12. State v. Farabee, 2000 MT 265, 9-10, 302 Mont. 29, 9-10, 22 P.3d 175, 9-
10.
13. Id. 1 13.
14. Id. T 19.
2004
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investigatory stop requirements. The court held that "[t]o stop a
person, an officer must have a particularized and objective basis
for suspecting the particular person of criminal activity."1 5 The
court stated that to demonstrate particularized suspicion, the
State must show: "(1) objective data from which an experienced
police officer can make certain inferences; and (2) a resulting
suspicion that the occupant of the vehicle is or has been engaged
in wrongdoing or was witness to criminal activity." 16 Finally,
the Farabee court held that whether "particularized suspicion
exists to justify an investigative stop is a question of fact which
is dependent upon the totality of the circumstances."'17
In Grinde v. State, the Montana Supreme Court explained
that peace officers are privileged to make noncriminal, non-
investigatory "welfare checks" of persons and vehicles, despite
having no particularized suspicion of wrongdoing."' The Grinde
court reviewed the stop of a driver whom police thought had
revved his engine and squealed his tires, but whom they saw
only driving safely.' 9 The court found the stop illegal, and
described the conditions in which a police officer may stop a
vehicle. 20 Though this was an investigatory stop case, and stops
for safety purposes were not at issue, the court stated that a
peace officer can stop a vehicle or a person for safety purposes
without particularized suspicion of wrongdoing.21
B. Search and Seizure
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
grants the right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures. 22  The same right is provided by Montana's con-
stitution.23 In Katz v. United States, the United States Supreme
Court reviewed what areas of interest are considered private,
and thus constitutionally protected from illegal searches and
seizures. 24 The Katz Court held that what a person seeks to
15. Id. 14.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. 249 Mont. 77, 813 P.2d 473 (1991).
19. Grinde, 249 Mont. at 78, 813 P.2d at 474 (1991).
20. Id., 249 Mont. at 81, 813 P.2d at 475-76.
21. Id., 249 Mont. at 81, 813 P.2d at 476.
22. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
23. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 11.
24. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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keep private, even if conducted in public places, is protected
under the Fourth Amendment.25 The Court laid out what came
to be known as the Katz test, used to determine whether a law
enforcement agent's action was a search in the constitutional
sense and therefore constitutionally protected. This test in-
volves two inquiries: 1) does the person have a subjective
expectation of privacy; and, 2) is that expectation reasonable? 26
Montana citizens are granted enhanced protection from
unlawful searches and seizures by the explicit right to privacy in
the Montana Constitution. Article II, section 10 provides: "The
right of individual privacy is essential to the well-being of a free
society and shall not be infringed without the showing of a
compelling state interest." The Montana Supreme Court has
explicitly stated that Montana's right to privacy grants Montana
citizens greater privacy rights than does the United States
Constitution. 27 For example, in State v. Siegal, the Montana
Supreme Court held that thermal imaging is a search in
Montana, even though it was not at that time considered a
search for purposes of the United States Constitution. 28
Once it is determined that an area of interest is private,
constitutional requirements attach and the area cannot be
searched without meeting these requirements. The general rule
of the United States Constitution and the Montana Constitution
is that warrantless searches and seizures are unlawful, but both
the United States Supreme Court and the Montana Supreme
Court have carved out exceptions to the warrant requirement.
The Montana Supreme Court has recognized a "hot pursuit"
exception to the warrant requirement, 29 a "search incident to
arrest" exception, 30 and a "stop and frisk" exception, which
means that the evidence is admissible if discovered from a
protective frisk during a stop based on reasonable suspicion. 31
Montana also recognizes a "plain view" exception to the warrant
25. Id. at 351.
26. Id. at 361.
27. State v. Siegal, 281 Mont. 250, 263, 934 P.2d 176, 183 (1977), overruled by State
v. Kuneff, 1998 MT 287, 291 Mont. 474, 970 P.2d 556.
28. See Siegal, 281 Mont. at 263, 278, 934 P.2d at 183, 192. See also Kyllo v. United
States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (finding thermal imaging violative of the Fourth Amendment
to the U.S. Constitution).
29. State v. Dow, 256 Mont. 126, 132, 844 P.2d 780, 784 (1992).
30. State v. Graham, 271 Mont. 510, 512, 898 P.2d 1206, 1208 (1995).
31. State v. Dawson, 1999 MT 171, 21, 295 Mont. 212, 21, 983 P.2d 916, 21.
2004
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requirement. 32 In a plain view situation, when an officer is in a
place where he has a legal right to be and he sees contraband,
there is no search in the constitutional sense. Finally, an officer
can conduct a warrantless search when presented with both
exigent circumstances and probable cause that a crime is being
or has been committed.33
The Montana Supreme Court is frequently called upon to
apply and interpret the warrant requirement and its exceptions,
particularly under the enhanced privacy rights granted by the
Montana Constitution. In State v. Elison, the Montana Supreme
Court analyzed an automobile stop, originally spurred by a
passenger in the officer's car who noticed the defendant, which
ultimately resulted in a search of the defendant's car and the
discovery of drugs and drug paraphernalia behind the car's
seats.3 4 The Elison court rejected an "automobile exception" to
the warrant requirement, which would imply exigent
circumstances into any search of a car, giving law enforcement
officers the power to search a car without a warrant if they had
probable cause.35 The Elison court also held that individuals
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the items stowed
behind their automobile seats. 36 The significance of the holding
on this issue is that under the Katz test, when one has a
reasonable expectation of privacy in something, it cannot be
searched without either a warrant or a recognized exception.
Because the officers in Elison had neither a warrant nor a
recognized exception to the warrant requirement, the court held
that the search was unlawful.37
Elison is one of many Montana cases in which the Montana
Supreme Court has demonstrated a proclivity for recognizing
increased privacy rights based on the Montana Constitution.
Another is State v. Bullock, in which the Montana Supreme
Court reviewed a conviction for possession of an unlawfully
killed elk found on fenced property by game wardens who had
entered the property without a warrant or probable cause.38
32. State v. Loh, 275 Mont. 460, 468, 914 P.2d 592, 597 (1996).
33. State v. Wakeford, 1998 MT 16, 7 30, 287 Mont. 220, 30, 953 P.2d 1065, 7 30.
34. State v. Elison, 2000 MT 288, 77 6-10, 302 Mont. 228, 7T7 6-10, 14 P.3d 456, TT 6-
10.
35. Id. 54.
36. Id. 49.
37. Id. 1 58.
38. 272 Mont. 361, 901 P.2d 61 (1995).
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Continuing the trend toward broader privacy protection in
Montana, the Montana Supreme Court held that the wardens'
entry onto the private land was illegal. 39 The court found that
under the Katz test, the defendant had a reasonable expectation
of privacy in a fenced yard.40 With this holding, the court did
away with the open fields doctrine, a former exception to the
warrant requirement that allowed law enforcement officers to
search in open fields around people's homes. 41
However, the Montana Supreme Court has applied the
broad privacy protection of Bullock only to areas that are clearly
identified as private property by a fence, sign, or other
indicator.42 In Montana, a homeowner cannot have an
objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in unposted and
unobstructed property leading to the front door of a home,
including the porch.43
C. Rights and Duties of Game Wardens and Sport Fishermen
The Montana legislature has explicitly defined the rights of
sportsmen and the duties of game wardens. Those who hunt
and fish are protected by the same constitutional rights as all
Montanans, but the law regulates certain aspects of hunting and
fishing. For example, Montana law makes it illegal to possess
unlawfully killed game fish or other dead animals.44 Montana
law also mandates that all persons who hunt or fish have a
license and exhibit the license to a game warden upon request. 45
The role of game wardens is also defined by the Montana
legislature. To become a game warden, an individual must pass
a test, meet certain departmental requirements, and take an
oath to uphold the United States Constitution.46 Game wardens
are authorized to act as officers in enforcing laws and
regulations.47 Wardens have the power to arrest upon probable
cause and to exercise other powers of peace officers. 48 Wardens
39. Bullock, 272 Mont. at 384-85, 901 P.2d at 75-76.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. State v. Hubbel, 286 Mont. 200, 210, 951 P.2d 971, 977 (1997).
44. MONT. CODE ANN. § 87-3-112(2) (2003).
45. MONT. CODE ANN. § 87-2-109 (2003).
46. MONT. CODE ANN. § 87-1-501 (2003).
47. MONT. CODE ANN. § 23-1-122 (2003).
48. Id.
2004
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have a statutory duty to enforce laws and rules relating to the
"protection, preservation, and propagation of game and fur-
bearing animals, fish, and game birds."49 Game wardens also
have the duty to see that persons who hunt or fish on state lands
have the requisite licenses. 50 Finally, wardens are charged with
a duty to "assist in the protection, conservation, and propagation
of fish."51
Game wardens also have unique authority in relation to
Montana's search and seizure laws. Like all law enforcement
officers, wardens have the power of search, seizure, and arrest.52
Montana law gives wardens the authority to inspect fish and
game "at reasonable times and at any location other than a
residence or dwelling."53 The same section goes on to provide a
duty to those who hunt and fish, stating that "[u]pon request
therefor, all persons having in their possession any fish [and]
game... shall exhibit the same and all thereof to the warden for
such inspection." 54 Wardens also have a specific exception to the
warrant requirement designed to allow them to search for
evidence of fish and game violations.55 The statute granting
wardens enforcement powers allows a warden to:
. . . search, without a warrant, any tent not used as a residence,
any boat, vehicle, box, locker, basket, creel, crate, game bag, or
package, or their contents upon probable cause to believe that any
fish and game law or department rule for the protection,
conservation, or propagation of game, fish, birds, or fur-bearing
animals has been violated. 56
Both wardens and sportsmen in Montana are thoroughly
regulated by Montana laws and additional rules promulgated by
the Department of Fish, Wildlife, and Parks. The wide scope of
this regulation serves to protect Montana's environment and
natural resources.
49. MONT. CODE ANN. § 87-1-502(2) (2003).
50. MONT. CODE ANN. § 87-1-502(3) (2003).
51. MONT. CODE ANN. § 87-1-502(4) (2003).
52. MONT. CODE ANN. § 87-1-502(7) (2003).
53. MONT CODE ANN. § 87-1-502(6) (2003).
54. Id.
55. MONT. CODE ANN. § 87-1-506 (2003).
56. Id.
8
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D. Search and Seizure Issues in Hunting and Fishing Contexts
1. Montana
The Montana Supreme Court has had limited opportunity to
address Montana's laws of hunting and fishing. In State v.
Huebner, the court held that hunters and anglers in Montana
have a responsibility to know the laws pertaining to their
sport. 57 The court addressed game wardens' duties in cases like
Bullock, discussed above, and State v. Romain.5 Like Bullock,
Romain involved an illegal elk in a fenced yard. In Romain,
game wardens received an anonymous tip about an illegally
killed elk on defendant's property.5 9 The wardens entered the
property, found the elk, and issued citations to the defendant. 60
Using Bullock as authority, the court held that the defendant,
whose property was lined with bushes and marked with "No
Trespassing" signs, had a reasonable expectation of privacy on
his property and that the game wardens had entered illegally. 61
Therefore, the court held that the search in Romain was an
invalid exercise of the wardens' duties. 62
The holdings of the Montana Supreme Court in cases like
Bullock, Huebner, and Romain have done little to clarify the
laws of hunting and fishing, since they have either addressed
the duties of sportsmen, as in Huebner, or addressed the narrow
issue of the right to privacy in residences and surrounding land.
Until Boyer, the court had not had an opportunity to distinguish
a warden's unique duties in hunting and fishing searches from
those of other law enforcement officers in other types of
searches. Thus, in Boyer, the court could turn only to Montana
statutes, Montana cases on related issues, and case law from
other jurisdictions.
2. Other Jurisdictions
Outside Montana, a number of courts have addressed issues
of search and seizure in hunting and fishing contexts, using a
57. 252 Mont. 184, 188, 827 P.2d 1260, 1263 (1992).
58. 1999 MT 161, 295 Mont. 152, 983 P.2d 322.
59. Romain, 4.
60. Id. 6, 10.
61. Id. 18-19.
62. Id.
2004
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variety of analyses to handle issues like those presented in
Boyer. In some states, like Tennessee, game wardens have
nearly unlimited search rights over those who hunt and fish. In
Monroe v. State, the Tennessee Supreme Court reviewed a game
warden's search of a hunter's car.63 The warden searched the
car without the hunter's consent and found an illegal deer.64
The Tennessee Supreme Court held that wardens are privileged
to make searches without search warrants. 65 Justifying this
conclusion, the Monroe court reasoned:
[H]e who undertakes to avail himself of a privilege granted by the
State must do so on whatever terms and conditions the State
chooses to annex to the exercise of the privilege, including the
waiver of constitutional rights .... [T]he hunting of wild animals
is a privilege granted by the State .... This being true, we see no
reason why the state may not annex to this privilege any condition
and limitation it sees fit. If the sportsman is unwilling to avail
himself of the privilege accorded him, upon the terms and
provisions prescribed, he may decline the invitation, but he cannot
enjoy the benefits of this act without submitting to its burdens and
restrictions. 66
Other states have a requirement similar to Montana's, that
game wardens must have "probable cause" or "reason to
believe"67 that game laws are being violated before they can
search. However, some states have interpreted this statute to
require no real probable cause of a violation. Illinois allows
warrantless searches when a game warden has reason to believe
game laws are being violated. Yet, in People v. Layton, the
Illinois Court of Appeals held that a warden can find reason to
believe simply through evidence that a person is or has been
hunting.68 The court said probable cause to search derives from
"indicia that the person in question is a hunter, immediately or
very recently engaged in hunting."69 And because hunting and
fishing are licensed, the Layton court reasoned, warrantless
searches of identifiable sportsmen are justified, since
63. 253 S.W.2d 734 (Tenn. 1952).
64. Id. at 734-35.
65. Id. at 735.
66. Id. at 735-36.
67. The phrases "reason to believe" and "probable cause" are synonymous in search
contexts. See People v. Layton, 552 N.E.2d 1280, 1287 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
68. Id.
69. Id.
196 Vol. 65
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"licensing ... may be deemed consent to some intrusions. 70
Despite the stated requirement that a warden have a "reason to
believe" game laws are being violated, Illinois effectively
provides hunters no greater protection from search than does
Tennessee. Illinois essentially grants wardens the right to
search during any valid exercise of their duties, since hunting
and fishing, rather than suspicious behavior, are the sources of
the probable cause.
In Minnesota, which distinguishes between wardens' search
rights over homes and wardens' rights to search other areas, a
recent case clarified the policy that game wardens are
indistinguishable from other law enforcement officers and must
adhere to the same constitutional search requirements. In State
v. Larsen, the Minnesota Court of Appeals addressed a
conservation officer's search of a fish house sitting on public
waters.71 The officer's search revealed both drug and game
violations, and the inhabitant of the fish house moved to have
the charges dismissed, arguing that the search was
constitutionally invalid.72 The court held that even though it
was on public waters, the fish house was a dwelling, and the
defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in it;
therefore, the search was unlawful. 73
Addressing the warden's power to search, the Larsen court
held that conservation officers are held to the same
constitutional constraints as other law enforcement officers. 74
The court reasoned:
Nothing sets a violation of the game and fish laws apart from all
other crimes. The state cannot argue with logic or reason that
conservation officers have more leeway to enter, detain, search,
and seize in pursuit of a citizen who may have an extra walleye,
duck, pheasant, or extra fishing line than law enforcement officers
in pursuit of a citizen alleged to have committed armed robbery or
murder!75
Based on this reasoning, the Larsen court ultimately held:
[Clonservation officers have the same range of powers in the
performance of their duties as all law enforcement officers,
including: relying on personal observations, tips, and confidential
70. Id.
71. 637 N.W.2d 315 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001), affld, 650 N.W.2d 144 (Minn. 2002).
72. Id. at 317.
73. Id. at 319-21.
74. Id. at 325.
75. Id. at 322.
2004
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informants, stopping and briefly detaining a person because of an
objective articulable suspicion of criminal activity, arresting for
crimes committed in their visual presence, arresting for probable
cause without a warrant, searching based upon a warrant, or
searching without a warrant under an enumerated exception, and
so on and so forth.76
The Larsen court declined to read broad search authority
into a Minnesota statute authorizing wardens to search "at
reasonable times," holding that the word "reasonable" implied
the final authority of the Minnesota Constitution and the United
States Constitution. 77  The court concluded the legislature
cannot override constitutional guarantees simply because of
statutory license requirements. 78  Minnesota declined to give
wardens the broad search powers granted them by states like
Tennessee, Illinois, and now Montana, and instead prioritized
citizens' privacy rights over game wardens' interests.
E. Constitutional Right to a Clean and Healthful Environment
The Montana Constitution forcefully proclaims Montanans'
right to a clean and healthful environment. Article II, section 3
states: "All persons are born free and have certain inalienable
rights. They include the right to a clean and healthful
environment... ."79 For many years after the adoption of this
right with Montana's 1972 constitution, the Montana Supreme
Court was reluctant to invoke it.
Recently however, the Montana Supreme Court has begun
to address and interpret the right to a clean and healthful
environment with increasing frequency. The court's early
reluctance to apply constitutional environmental provisions has
been overshadowed by more recent decisions implicating and
interpreting the right to a clean and healthful environment.
The most notable of these was the court's 1999 decision in
Montana Environmental Information Center v. Department of
Environmental Quality (hereinafter MEIC).80  In MEIC, envi-
ronmental groups challenged a Montana statutes' exempting
76. Id. at 323-24.
77. 637 N.W.2d at 324.
78.. Id.
79. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 3.
80. 1999 MT 248, 296 Mont. 207, 988 P.2d 1236.
81. MONT. CODE ANN. § 75-5-317(2)(j) (1995).
Vol. 65
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certain types of water testing from non-degradation review.8 2 In
an opinion authored by Justice Trieweiler, the court first
determined that environmental groups have standing to
challenge decisions that may impact the environment.83
The court found that the right to a clean and healthful
environment "is a fundamental right.., and that any statute or
rule which implicates that right must be strictly scrutinized...
[emphasis in original]."84 The court further held that the article
II, section 3 right to a clean and healthful environment, and the
duty to protect and improve the environment described in article
IX, section 1 are complementary and must be applied "in
tandem."8 5 The plaintiff argued, and the court agreed, that the
provisions should be applicable to potential environmental
damage, the protections being both "anticipatory and
preventative."8' 6 The court noted its intention to apply strict
scrutiny to "state or private action which implicates either
constitutional provision."87 Although the court did not discuss
whether the rights are self-executing, its interpretation of the
constitutional right seems to indicate a belief that the right
requires no further legislative action to be judicially enforceable.
In Cape-France v. Peed, the Montana Supreme Court built
upon its interpretation in MEIC and further clarified the
Montana Constitution's environmental provisions.88 In par-
ticular, the Cape-France opinion made another clear statement
of the court's willingness to invoke the right to a clean and
healthful environment and explicitly expanded the mention
made in MEIC of the private duty to protect and improve the
environment.8 9  The Boyer decision represents even further
movement on the part of the court away from its original
reluctance to apply the constitutional right to a clean and
healthful environment, as the Boyer court invoked the right
unnecessarily in order to justify a game warden's search.90
82. 1999 MT 248, 17, 296 Mont. 207, 17, 988 P.2d 1236, 17.
83. Id. 45.
84. Id. 63.
85. Id. 65.
86. Id. 77.
87. Id. 64.
88. 2001 MT 139, 305 Mont. 513, 29 P.3d 1011.
89. Id. 31-37.
90. Boyer, 39.
2004
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III. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF STATE V. BOYER
On Sunday, April 18, 1999, Game Warden Steve Jones was
patrolling by boat on the Missouri River in Phillips County,
Montana, when he observed a boat anchored in the river which
appeared unoccupied. 91 Jones approached the boat to determine
whether it was unoccupied and to inquire as to the welfare of its
possible passenger. 92 When Jones got closer, he called out to
determine whether the boat was occupied and, if so, whether the
passenger was okay. 93 James William Boyer sat up in the boat
and stated that he was okay and was just waking up from a
nap.9
4
Jones asked Boyer if he had been fishing and Boyer replied
he had been fishing since Friday afternoon. 95 Jones asked to see
Boyer's fishing license, and Boyer produced a valid Montana
license. 96  Jones asked if Boyer had any fish and Boyer
responded he did and that they were in the boat's live well. 97
When Jones asked Boyer to produce the catch, Boyer responded
by suggesting that Jones inspect Boyer's catch later in the
evening at a boat launch. 98 Jones rejected this suggestion,
stating that he was going to be heading down river and that he
needed to inspect the fish immediately.99 From where he was
sitting in his boat, Jones could not see into Boyer's live well. 100
Boyer removed eight fish from the live well and showed them to
Jones. 10 1 Boyer then hesitated and again suggested that Jones
91. Appellant's Brief at 2, Boyer, 2002 MT 33, 308 Mont. 276, 42 P.3d 771 (No. 00-
183).
92. Respondent's Brief at 2, Boyer, 2002 MT 33, 308 Mont. 276, 42 P.3d 771 (No. 00-
183).
93. Appellant's Brief at 3, Boyer, 2002 MT 33, 308 Mont. 276, 42 P.3d 771 (No. 00-
183).
94. Id.
95. Respondent's Brief at 4, Boyer, 2002 MT 33, 308 Mont. 276, 42 P.3d 771 (No. 00-
183).
96. Id.
97. Appellant's Brief at 5, Boyer, 2002 MT 33, 308 Mont. 276, 42 P.3d 771 (No. 00-
183).
98. Respondent's Brief at 4, Boyer, 2002 MT 33, 308 Mont. 276, 42 P.3d 771 (No. 00-
183).
99. Appellant's Brief at 5-6, Boyer, 2002 MT 33, 308 Mont. 276, 42 P.3d 771 (No. 00-
183).
100. Respondent's Brief at 5, Boyer, 2002 MT 33, 308 Mont. 276, 42 P.3d 771 (No. 00-
183).
101. Id. (The combined possession limit for sauger and walleye at this time was ten
fish.)
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inspect his remaining fish at a later time. 10 2
In order to inspect Boyer's catch for himself, Jones tied his
boat onto Boyer's and stepped onto the transom, a platform
attached to the back of Boyer's boat. 10 3 From the transom, Jones
could see into Boyer's live well, where he observed additional
fish in excess of the legal possession limit.10 4 Jones determined
that Boyer had a total of nineteen dead sauger and walleye in
his possession. 0 5 Jones confiscated the excess fish and issued
Boyer a notice to appear for possession of unlawfully killed game
fish. 106
Boyer was convicted in justice court of possession of
unlawfully killed game fish. 0 7 He appealed his conviction to the
district court and filed a motion to suppress the evidence on the
grounds that Jones had performed an illegal search of his
boat.'08 The district court held that no search occurred as Boyer
did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy over his boat on
a public waterway. 109 The district court denied Boyer's motion
to suppress, and Boyer appealed the decision to the Montana
Supreme Court.110
IV. THE BOYER DECISION
The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the district court's
denial of Boyer's motion to suppress, with four justices signing
on to the majority opinion written by Justice Regnier. Justice
Leaphart filed a specially concurring opinion, joined by Chief
Justice Grey. Justices Nelson and Trieweiler each filed separate
dissenting opinions.
The sole issue presented to the supreme court on appeal was
whether the district court erred in denying Boyer's motion to
102. Id.
103. Appellant's Brief at 6, Boyer, 2002 MT 33, 308 Mont. 276, 42 P.3d 771 (No. 00-
183).
104. Respondent's Brief at 6, Boyer, 2002 MT 33, 308 Mont. 276, 42 P.3d 771 (No. 00-
183).
105. Id.
106. Boyer, 5.
107. Id. % 6. Boyer was convicted of violating MONT. CODE ANN. § 87-3-112(2) (1999).
108. Respondent's Brief at 6, Boyer, 2002 MT 33, 308 Mont. 276, 42 P.3d 771 (No. 00-
183).
109. Boyer, 6.
110. Id.
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suppress.11 Boyer argued that Jones initiated an illegal inves-
tigatory stop, unlawfully compelled production of his fishing
license and catch, and performed an illegal search of his boat
and live well.112 The majority rejected each of these arguments,
holding that the stop and the request to produce a valid fishing
license and catch were both within the warden's rights, and that
no search occurred.11 3
First, the majority held that Jones's stop of Boyer's boat was
a legal welfare check rather than an investigatory stop.11 4 Boyer
argued that Montana law requires a peace officer to have a
particularized suspicion of wrongdoing before stopping a person
or vehicle, and Jones had no particularized suspicion. 15 The
majority found this statute inapplicable, citing Grinde v. State
for the proposition that "[a] police officer can legally stop a
vehicle for a bona fide reason which is related to functions
within his authority and duties."116  The majority reasoned
because Jones testified that the boat appeared unoccupied and
that he approached the boat to inquire into the safety of the
boat's potential occupants, the stop was not really
investigatory.1 17 The majority stated: "We would never seek to
discourage wardens or other law enforcement officials from
assisting persons in potential distress."118 The majority rea-
soned that Jones was acting within his authority as a peace
officer by attempting to assist a person in potential distress.11 9
Since, by the court's reasoning, the stop was for safety purposes,
it did not fall within the requirements of the investigatory stop
statute and therefore the warden was not required to have a
particularized suspicion of wrongdoing.120
Boyer next contented that even if the court held Jones's
initial stop of his boat was a lawful welfare check, his right to
detain Boyer for safety reasons ended when he determined that
Boyer was safe. Boyer reasoned that after ascertaining his
111. Id. I8.
112. Id. %79.
113. Id. 7U 43.
114. Id. 13.
115. Id. 10; MONT. CODEANN. § 46-5-401 (1999).
116. Boyer, 7 11, (citing Grinde v. State, 244 Mont. 77, 81, 813 P.3d 473, 476) (1991).
117. Boyer, $% 12-13.
118. Id. 13.
119. Id.
120. Id. 771 11-13.
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safety, any further detention by Jones was an investigatory stop,
so Jones needed a particularized suspicion of wrongdoing before
asking Boyer to produce his fishing license. 12' The majority
rejected this argument, referring to Montana statutes providing
that wardens shall ensure that persons who fish possess the
requisite licenses 122 and that those persons must display the
licenses to wardens upon request. 123 The court stated: "Clearly,
these statutes make no reference to a particularized suspicion
requirement prior to requesting production of a game license."124
The court declined to read into the statutes a requirement that a
warden have a particularized suspicion of wrongdoing before
requesting production of a license. Instead, the majority held
that a warden may request a hunting or fishing license "when
the circumstances reasonably indicate that an individual has
been engaged in those activities." 125
Boyer then argued that Jones performed an illegal search
by requesting production of his catch, since Jones did not have
probable cause at the time to believe that Boyer had committed
a violation. 126 Boyer's argument rested on the premise that a
warden's request of a fisherman to produce a catch, without
further physical inspection, constitutes a search. Wardens are
granted authority to make such requests by section 87-1-502(6)
of the Montana Code, which states:
A warden has the authority to inspect any and all fish, game and
nongame birds, waterfowl, game animals, and fur-bearing animals
at reasonable times and at any location other than a residence or
dwelling. Upon request therefor, all persons having in their
possession any fish, game and nongame birds, waterfowl, game
animals, and fur-bearing animals shall exhibit the same and all
thereof to the warden for such inspection.
Boyer argued the statute must be read in conjunction with
section 87-1-506(1)(b) of the Montana Code which provides that
a warden may perform a warrantless search of a boat, box,
vehicle or other item used to stow game if the warden has
probable cause to believe a fish and game law or rule has been
121. Id. 14.
122. Id. V 15 (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 87-1-502(3) (1999)).
123. Id. (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 87-2-109 (1999)).
124. Id. It 15.
125. Id. 16
126. Id. 11 17.
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violated.127 The court therefore had to determine whether a
warden's request to a fisherman to exhibit fish qualified as a
"search" of the type contemplated by the legislature in section
87-1-506(1), and thus required either a warrant or probable
cause.
To determine whether a request qualifies as a search, the
court looked to Montana law. The majority cited State v. Scheetz
for the proposition that "an impermissible search and seizure
only occurs within the meaning of article II, section 10 of the
Montana Constitution when a reasonable expectation of privacy
has been breached."128 Boyer argued that by placing his fish in a
closed live well, he demonstrated an actual and reasonable
expectation of privacy. However, the majority analyzed neither
the potential intrusiveness of such a request, nor whether Boyer
had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his live well.
Rather, the majority stated, "[t]he precise inquiry, then, is
whether Boyer is entitled to a reasonable expectation of privacy
in the game fish he possessed."1 29  The majority cited the
Montana Constitution's mandate that "the state and each
person shall maintain and improve a clean and healthful
environment in Montana for present and future generations. 13 °
It reasoned that Boyer's proposition-that wardens must have
probable cause of wrongdoing before requesting production of a
fisherman's catch-"would virtually require wardens or third
parties to have personal knowledge of fish and game violations
prior to conducting the contemplated inspection."' 31 The court
held that an expectation of privacy in game fish is not one
society is willing to recognize as reasonable. 132 The majority
believed "[t]he inevitable result [of a contrary holding] would be
the unnecessary depletion of Montana's wildlife and fish which
we are all bound to protect and preserve.1' 33 Thus, the court
found that since Boyer had no reasonable expectation of privacy
127. Id. 18 MONT. CODE ANN. § 87-1-506(1)(b) (2003).
128. Boyer, 18 (citing State v. Scheetz, 286 Mont. 41, 46, 950 P.2d 722, 724-25
(1997)). MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10 states, "The right of individual privacy is essential to
the well-being of a free society and shall not be infringed without the showing of a
compelling state interest."
129. Boyer, 18.
130. MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 1(1).
131. Boyer, 23.
132. Id. 21.
133. Id. 1 23.
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over his catch, the warden's request of Boyer to produce his
catch could not constitute a search subject to constitutional
protection, and therefore the probable cause requirement of
section 87-1-506(1)(b) would not apply to such a request.134
Boyer then argued that even if Jones's request to produce
his catch could not be considered a search, Jones initiated an
illegal search when he tied onto Boyer's boat and stepped onto
the transom. Addressing this issue, the majority first held that
since Jones restrained Boyer's freedom of movement when he
tied the boats together, that action constituted an investigative
stop.' 35 Under Montana law, the warden needed particularized
suspicion to conduct such a stop. 136 Particularized suspicion
requires: (1) objective data from which an experienced police
officer can make certain inferences; and (2) a resulting suspicion
that the occupant of the vehicle is or has been engaged in
wrongdoing or was witness to criminal activity.' 37 The majority
held that Boyer's reluctance to present his catch was objective
data upon which Jones could reasonably have based a suspicion
that Boyer was involved in wrongdoing.138
Concluding that the stop was acceptable, the court next
looked to whether Jones performed a search when he stepped
onto the transom of Boyer's boat.1 39 Comparing the transom of a
boat to the porch of a house and the running board of a pickup
truck, the majority held that Boyer did not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the transom of his boat, so this was not
a search in the constitutional sense.1 40  Finally, the court
revisited the discussion of whether an individual has a
reasonable expectation of privacy in game fish.' 41 The court held
that because of Montana's constitutional mandate to the state
and citizens to preserve and maintain a clean environment, an
individual cannot have an objectively reasonable expectation of
privacy in game fish.142
The majority concluded that the initial stop was a lawful
134. Id. 9 26.
135. Id. 91 28.
136. Id. 9 29; Farabee, 14.
137. Boyer, 91 29; Farabee, 14.
138. Boyer, 91 30.
139. Id. 91 32.
140. Id. 9191 33-36.
141. Id. 39.
142. Id.
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welfare check, that the request to see Boyer's license and catch
was a lawful exercise of the warden's duties, and that the
warden had particularized suspicion to conduct an investigative
stop. The majority reasoned that Boyer had no reasonable
expectation of privacy in his fish, so Jones did not conduct a
search. 143 The majority held that since no search occurred, the
District Court correctly denied Boyer's motion to suppress.144
V. ANALYSIS
A. Problems with the Boyer Court's Reasoning
Faced with the challenge of balancing Montana's values of
privacy and environmental protection, the court in Boyer
prioritized wardens' inspection duties over the privacy rights of
hunters and fishermen. Nonetheless, the holding of this case
likely comes as little surprise and as even less of a
disappointment to legitimate sportsmen. Wardens have differ-
ent rights and duties from those of police officers, and they are
given specific instructions from the legislature as to what their
duties are and how to carry them out.145 Sportsmen engaged in
the acts of hunting and fishing know that licenses are required,
that they are required to produce these licenses in certain
circumstances, and that by hunting and fishing they subject
themselves to the authority of game wardens to inspect and
search areas that may be considered private in other contexts. 146
The Boyer court's conclusion may well be consistent with both
Montana law and the expectations of most Montanans; however,
its reasoning is consistent with neither. The court misapplied
Montana statutes and misinterpreted its own precedent to reach
the holding in Boyer.
In analyzing Jones's initial advance on Boyer's boat, the
143. Id. 42.
144. Id. 43.
145. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 23-1-122 (2003) (describing specific enforcement powers
of park rangers and game wardens); see also MONT. CODE ANN. § 87-1-502 (2003)
(specifying qualifications, powers, and duties of fish and game wardens); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 87-1-506 (2003) (elaborating on enforcement powers of wardens).
146. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 87-2-109 (2003) (outlining licensing requirement for
fishermen); see also MONT. CODE ANN. § 87-1-502(6) (2003) (requiring those who have
fish and game in their possession to exhibit them to wardens for inspection); see also
MONT. CODE ANN. § 87-1-506(1)(b) (2003) (authorizing wardens to search with probable
cause that a fish and game law or rule has been violated).
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majority correctly concluded that a warden has a right to
approach boats and inquire after their occupants. 147  Inter-
estingly, the court took great pains in this section to emphasize
that Jones did not need particularized suspicion of wrongdoing
because he was stopping the boat to inquire after Boyer's
safety.' 48 Although this reasoning is sound, the majority need
not have conducted such a laborious analysis. Doing so over-
looks a game warden's legal option to approach a boat simply
because it is a boat. The mere appearance of hunting and
fishing on state land gives a warden the right to approach a boat
or a vehicle to exercise his statutory duties of license check and
catch inspection. 149 Implicit in these duties is a game warden's
right to approach a boat and inquire after the behavior of its
passengers. The court's attempt to justify Jones's stop of Boyer
as a welfare stop, though harmless, was thus unnecessary.
The court's analysis of Jones's request to see Boyer's license
is a more appropriate application of the duties of game
wardens.15 0  Wardens have explicit statutory authority to
request a fishing license, and Montana law makes it clear that
neither probable cause nor particularized suspicion is nec-
essary.'5 ' Although in a different context the detention of a
sportsman to check a license could be characterized as either an
investigatory stop or a seizure, the majority properly observes
that people fishing on state lands consent to such intrusions by
virtue of their use of state resources and the license re-
quirement. 52 The exception is not one of policy, but one ex-
plicitly authorized by state law.153 The holding reached in this
section, that Jones had legal authority to request Boyer's license
without probable cause or particularized suspicion, is consistent
with Montana law and the facts of this case.
The majority's reasoning is more problematic in the next
section, which addresses the issue of whether Jones's request to
147. Boyer, 9[ 13.
148. Id. il 10-13.
149. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 87-2-109 (requiring fishermen to exhibit licenses to
wardens for inspection). This statute impliedly permits wardens to approach those who
appear to be fishing and request their licenses.
150. Boyer, 99T 15-16.
151. MONT. CODE ANN. § 87-1-502(3), (6), (7) (2003).
152. MONT. CODE ANN. § 87-2-109 (2003).
153. Id.
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search Boyer's catch constitutes a search. 154 Again, the majority
correctly found that such a request does not qualify as an
unlawful search because the request is permitted by state law. 155
Although the holding of this section is legally sound, the
majority's analysis mischaracterizes the issue and improperly
implicates an important provision of Montana's constitution.
To determine whether a request is a search, the court need
only have noted that a simple request is not only authorized by
state law, but involves no invasion of a protected area of
interest. Not until the warden seeks to inspect a protected
physical location do probable cause requirements attach. The
plain language of Montana statutes dictates this difference.
Section 87-1-502(6) grants wardens the authority to inspect fish
and game at any location other than a residence (e.g., a boat). 156
After the warden requests or demands the production of the fish
and game, the person possessing it must give it to the warden. 157
Then the warden can inspect what is produced. Section 502(6)
grants wardens the authority to inspect the fish and game-not
boxes, boats, and other storage areas. If, after this initial
inspection, the warden has probable cause to believe that the
person is not producing all fish and game, or that another fish
and game rule is being violated, section 87-1-506(1) permits the
warden to search boats, boxes, and other physical spaces
without a warrant. 158 The inspection allowed by section 506(1)
is a search that requires probable cause. The preliminary
request authorized by section 502(6), and made by Jones of
Boyer, is not a search.
Yet, the majority chose to address the issue of whether such
a request is a search by mischaracterizing the area of interest
that Boyer was seeking to keep private and improperly framing
the issue, which resulted in an unnecessary and legally
inaccurate analysis of the Montana Constitution. The majority
cited the established principle that "[w]here no reasonable
expectation of privacy exists, there is neither a 'search' nor a
'seizure'."1 59 The majority did not, however, explain that this
principle applies to areas in which an individual possesses a
154. Boyer, T 17-26.
155. MONT. CODE ANN. § 87-1-502(6), (7) (2003).
156. MONT. CODE ANN. § 87-1-502(6) (2003).
157. Id.
158. MONT. CODE ANN. § 87-1-506 (1)(b) (2003).
159. Boyer, 20 (citing State v. Bullock, 272 Mont. 361, 377, 901 P.2d 61, 71 (1995)).
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reasonable expectation of privacy rather than items in which a
person has an expectation of privacy. Previous cases addressing
reasonable expectation of privacy clearly indicate this
distinction. The court in Bullock analyzed whether one can have
a reasonable expectation of privacy in open fields, not whether
one can have a reasonable expectation of privacy in elk.160 In
Elison, the court discussed whether an individual can have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in items stored behind a car
seat. 161 The Elison court did not, of course, analyze whether the
defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in drugs. If
the focus is on what is found, rather than where it is found, the
Montana Supreme Court could not find a reasonable expectation
of privacy in any search cases that result in a conviction. One is
typically not convicted of a crime in search cases unless the
officer finds something illegal, whether it is excess fish, drugs, or
a dead body. Fortunately, until Boyer, we could rest assured
that the validity of a search would be evaluated based upon its
process rather than its result.
But in Boyer, the court missed an opportunity to clearly
hold that a request is not a search based on section 87-1-502(6),
and instead framed the issue as "whether Boyer is entitled to a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the game fish he poss-
essed."162  The court held that he was not, since having a
reasonable expectation of privacy over game fish would violate
Montana's constitutional mandate that "[t]he state and each
person shall maintain and improve a clean and healthful
environment in Montana for present and future generations.' 63
As discussed above, this provision was hardly brought up for
decades after its adoption. It was unnecessarily implicated here.
Improper reliance on a constitution dilutes both the integrity of
the document and the power of its provisions. Courts should not
implicate constitutional provisions unless necessary. No user of
Montana's land nor legal scholar will dispute that the right to a
clean and healthful environment and the mandate to provide for
environmental protection are important sections in Montana's
constitution, serving as necessary complements to many land
use laws and regulations. But this is just the reason the
160. Bullock, 272 Mont. at 384, 901 P.2d at 75-76.
161. State v. Elison, 2000 MT 288, 49, 302 Mont. 228, 247, 14 P.3d 456, 469.
162. Boyer, 18.
163. Id. 21-22 (quoting MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 1(1)).
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environmental provisions should be used sparingly and with
only the greatest care.
The majority went further astray from constitutional
principles when analyzing Jones's tying onto and then stepping
onto Boyer's boat. 164 The court called this "the most important
phase of our inquiry," and indeed it is, since this represented a
turning point in the encounter between Jones and Boyer.
Following Jones's request to see Boyer's license and catch, Boyer
"opened the live well and reluctantly removed eight fish."165
Boyer then "requested that Jones conduct the inspection at a
later time."1 66 Based upon these actions, Jones drifted to the
end of Boyer's boat, tied on, stepped on Boyer's transom, peered
into his live well, and discovered excess fish. 167
Jones's investigatory acts of tying and stepping onto Boyer's
boat should have triggered constitutional search protections and
the probable cause requirement of section 87-1-502(6) of the
Montana Code. After Boyer refused to allow further inspection
of his catch and live well, Jones's subsequent actions were
investigatory, and therefore subject to constitutional
requirements. The majority acknowledged this when analyzing
Jones's tying onto Boyer's boat, but inappropriately abandoned
this reasoning when analyzing Jones's stepping onto Boyer's
boat. The majority held that tying onto Boyer's boat was an
investigatory stop, for which the warden needed particularized
suspicion.'68 Reasoning that Boyer's hesitancy and request that
Jones inspect his catch at a later time constituted objective
evidence to support reasonable suspicion, the majority held the
stop permissible. 169
But did the warden have reasonable suspicion-or, as
required by statute, probable cause-to then search Boyer? The
court could have held that the objective evidence supporting
Jones's reasonable suspicion that Boyer had violated game laws
also gave Jones probable cause to search Boyer's boat. Or the
164. Boyer, T 27-37.
165. Id. 27.
166. Id.
167. Id. 1 127, 37.
168. Id. I T 28-29 (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-5-401 (2003) (describing
particularized suspicion requirement for investigative stops)); State v. Farabee, 2000 MT
265, 14, 302 Mont. 29, 14, 22 P.3d 175, 14 (providing required factors for
particularized suspicion).
169. Boyer, 30.
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court could have followed Jones's own testimony at the
suppression hearing that he did not have probable cause to
search. 170 But instead, the court excused the warden from the
probable cause requirement by reasoning that, following the
investigatory stop, Jones's act of stepping from his boat onto
Boyer's was just a casual, legal, and non-investigatory visit to an
unprotected area of interest, like stepping onto someone's
porch.171 The majority reasoned that the transom of a boat is
analogous to the porch of a home.' 72 It follows that if a transom
is like a porch, and there is no reasonable expectation of privacy
over a porch, there can be no reasonable expectation of privacy
over a transom. Once the warden was on the transom of Boyer's
boat, the live well was in plain view, so the court found there
was no search of Boyer's boat.173
The problem with the court's analysis is that a transom and
a porch are not analogous. The majority stated that a transom
is an appendage to a boat used to approach the boat, just as a
porch is an appendage to a house used to approach the house. 174
Since houses are more private than boats, the majority
reasoned, and porches are not protected areas of interest, there
can be no reasonable expectation of privacy over transoms.
Common sense demonstrates the problems with this analysis.
Porches are open to the public. They are visited daily by mail
carriers, solicitors, neighbors, and strangers. Transoms on boats
serve no such purpose. The door of a home keeps unwanted
guests from entering. The water surrounding a boat is the
boat's equivalent protection from outsiders. The porch is outside
the buffer of the door. A transom is within the buffer of water.
According to the majority's reasoning, police officers and
strangers can legally step on a boat's transom as though
stepping on the porch of a home, with no cause and no
permission. The consequence of this error is that the majority
makes a part of the boat-and anything that can be seen from
that place-open to the public. This is analogous to saying that
the front hall of a home is public, and anything that can be seen
in plain view from the front hall is public as well. The effect is
170. Id. IT 31.
171. Id. 7T 31-36.
172. Id. 7 34.
173. Id. 7[ 37.
174. Id. 7 34.
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to make the entire boat a public, rather than private, area.
The court went on to make a more appropriate comparison
between the transom of a boat and the running board or bumper
of a pickup truck. 175 A running board is a much more reasonable
analogue to a transom than that of a porch, and the court
observed that stepping on running boards and bumpers happens
''on numerous occasions throughout hunting season in Montana
without hunters thinking that their privacy rights have been
invaded."176 Yet even if the act of stepping on a running board is
both common and legal, the warden's authority in this area
would still be subject to certain limits. For example, the warden
would not have the authority to search for game in the glove
compartment of a truck, or under the seats, or in the back of the
cab, because probable cause would not extend to such locations.
Wardens may have authority to search enclosed locations
without warrants, but only in certain contexts and with probable
cause
1 77
The majority used its misguided attempts to define a
transom as a public place to distinguish this case from State v.
Elison.178 The court distinguished Boyer from Elison using the
second prong of the Katz test, which requires that, for an
inspection to qualify as a search, the individual being searched
must have an expectation of privacy that society is willing to
recognize as objectively reasonable. 79 The Boyer court reasoned
that the defendant in Elison had an objectively reasonable
expectation of privacy over items stowed under a car seat, while
Boyer did not have "an objectively reasonable expectation of
privacy in game fish."'80 The true comparison would be between
items stowed under a car seat and items stowed in a live well, or
between drugs and fish. Were the court to have used one of
these comparisons, Elison would support a finding that the
Boyer search was unlawful. However, the court was able to
distinguish the two cases because, as discussed above, the
Elison court defined the reasonable expectation of privacy by the
accouterments of place, not by the items found. By resting its
175. Boyer, 35.
176. Id. T 41.
177. MONT. CODE ANN. § 87-1-506 (2003).
178. Boyer, 38-42.
179. Id. 20 (citing State v. Bassett, 1999 MT 109, 1 24, 294 Mont. 327, T 24, 982
P.2d 410, 24). See supra text accompanying notes 24-26 for explanation of Katz test.
180. Boyer, 39.
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holding in Boyer on the consistent use of such flawed reasoning,
the Montana Supreme Court leaves itself and the property
rights of all Montanans vulnerable to attack when closer cases
arise.
B. Implications
The holding and reasoning of Boyer leave the privacy rights
of all Montanans, but particularly those who hunt and fish, in a
vulnerable state. Under Boyer, wardens have almost unlimited
rights to search, since the court has demonstrated a willingness
to excuse wardens from the requirement of probable cause, and
the searches are justified by what the wardens find, not by
where or how they conduct the search. Holding that privacy
rights are suspended when a warden is fortunate enough to find
illegal game fish opens the door for broad violations of privacy
by game wardens. Similarly, opening the transom of a boat up
as a public place exposes the boat to unexpected and unwanted
intrusions. This should be of immediate concern to all those who
hunt and fish on state land, since the privacy protection afforded
them by Montana's constitution and statutes have been
rendered toothless by the court's reasoning in Boyer.
However, this holding should also be of concern to others,
since the Boyer standards for search and seizure duties of law
enforcement officers and the rights of those they search can now
be applied by extension into non-sport contexts, creating a
slippery slope. In Boyer, the court upheld a search based on the
legality of the items found, rather than the privacy of the area
searched. While this certainly makes police work easier, it could
open the door for widespread trampling of civil rights. Under a
standard that focuses on the items found, law enforcement
would never have to think twice before conducting a search-or
at least would have to consider only whether the search was
justified enough to avoid a civil lawsuit. If a search yielded
nothing illegal, there would be no reason to charge the person
with a crime. If a search resulted in a discovery of contraband,
the search could be upheld regardless of its compliance with
constitutional and statutory guidelines, since the court has now
effectively held that one cannot have a legitimate expectation of
privacy in contraband. Unconscious of its errors in reasoning,
the Montana Supreme Court could easily apply aspects of this
holding to other law enforcement officers and other protected
areas of interest. In doing so, the court would undermine the
privacy rights in the Montana Constitution and reverse the
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court's previous tendency toward expanding our rights to
privacy.
C. A Better Standard for Searches by Game Wardens
The Montana Supreme Court had in Boyer, and may have in
future cases, an opportunity to clarify the permissible scope of
searches by game wardens under Montana fish and game laws.
Although the Boyer court's reasoning skirted the statutory
requirement of probable cause, the Montana Supreme Court
may someday revisit this issue and have an opportunity to
incorporate the statutory requirement into game warden
searches. If the court faces such an issue again, it should allow
Montana's clear warden search statutes, requiring probable
cause for game warden searches, to inform its decision.
The warden search statute allows a warden to search
certain areas, like boats and coolers, upon probable cause that a
game law or department rule is being violated.181 A warden's act
of tying onto a fisherman's boat, stepping on his transom, and
peering into his cooler falls squarely under the warden search
statute. If faced again with an issue like that in Boyer, the court
need only look to this statute to determine the parameters of a
warden's search and recognize that inspections of all but the
most exposed areas require either a warrant or probable cause.
Montana law has clearly defined the need for probable
cause before conducting a search of enclosed areas like coolers
on boats. The meaning of "probable cause" under the warden
search statute may not be as clear, but the court has ample
authority to clarify the meaning of this common term. If the
court were inclined to give wardens broad authority, but still
wished to acknowledge the probable cause requirement, it could
use an analysis like that of the Illinois Supreme Court and hold
that probable cause in hunting and fishing contexts is derived
simply from evidence that the defendant has been hunting or
fishing.182 The Illinois standard is preferable to the court's
analysis in Boyer; it at least acknowledges the need for probable
cause in this type of search. Yet the Illinois standard ignores
the legislative intent to require actual evidence of a game law
violation, renders the statutory requirement of probable cause
181. MONT. CODE ANN. § 87-1-506 (2003).
182. People v. Layton, 552 N.E.2d 1280, 1287 (Ill. App. 1990). See supra text
accompanying notes 68-70.
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superfluous, and-if used in Montana-would be inconsistent
with the enhanced privacy protections ensured to Montana
citizens by their state constitution.
An alternative standard, and a more appropriate guide for
the Montana Supreme Court under Montana's privacy
jurisprudence, would be the Minnesota Supreme Court's
reasoning in State v. Larsen.8 3 Under the Minnesota standard,
licensing requirements do not allow for the suspension of
constitutional rights and wardens are held to the same
standards as other law enforcement officers. Following
Minnesota's example, the Montana Supreme Court could require
wardens to have probable cause or a search warrant before
searching boats, vehicles, or enclosed spaces. This standard,
and the Larsen court's reasoning, is more consistent with
Montana's warden search statute and the Montana Supreme
Court's previous privacy decisions.
If the Montana Supreme Court had followed the plain
language of the warden search statute, Jones's inspection of
Boyer's catch would qualify as a search. However, using the
language of the statute and the Minnesota approach to probable
cause, the court still could have found Jones's search to be legal.
The court referred to Jones's testimony that he had
particularized suspicion to stop Boyer based on his experience
and his belief that Boyer was acting in a suspicious manner.184
Analyzing this testimony, the court could have found that the
same evidence supported probable cause to believe that Boyer
had violated fish and game laws. If the court found that Jones
had probable cause, the search would have been legal under the
warden search statute. If there was no probable cause, the
search violated Montana law, and any evidence obtained from it
should have been suppressed.
VI. CONCLUSION
State v. Boyer is noteworthy to the Montana legal
community both for its potential erosion of privacy protection
and for its improper interpretation of Montana's constitution
and statutes. In deciding Boyer, the Montana Supreme Court
had a wealth of legal sources to turn to: Montana's ever-
183. 637 N.W.2d 315, 322-25 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001). See supra text accompanying
notes 71-78.
184. Boyer, 30.
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increasing body of case law invoking our constitutional right to
privacy; the explicit statutes describing game wardens' rights
and responsibilities; and extrajurisdictional case law addressing
search issues in sporting situations. Collectively, one would
expect these sources to have led the court to mandate
suppression of the Boyer search. Yet it is possible that the Boyer
decision was driven not by legal precedent, but by the
complicated facts of the case. In the end, the court may have
stretched the law to uphold a hard-working game warden's
search of a fisherman who showed little respect for Montana's
natural resources.
It remains to be seen whether Boyer turns out to be an
anomalous case of suspended privacy protection in Montana or
the start of a slippery slope toward searches justified by their
end result and unnecessary implication of the Montana
Constitution. Either way, Boyer is a classic illustration of the
need for careful interpretation of legal precedent and the
constitution. We all deserve to have our public lands protected
and our law enforcement officers empowered to do their jobs, but
we must be vigilant in demanding that protection does not come
at the expense of our most vital individual rights.
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